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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
operation of law. Such a person either cannot take the legal title
at all,10 or else is declared constructive trustee of the property.11
Judicially articulated public policy there prevents hte wrongdoer
from taking, squarely in the face of statutes of descent which vest
property in the killer immediately upon the death of the decedent."
Public policy may go far to controvert statutory law, or to work,
an exception to an insurance contract, 3 where the beneficiary is a
wrongdoer; but in the instant set-up, where the beneficiary is entirely innocent, it is submitted that to override established law
public policy should be given legislative expression.
Certainly, unless there is evidence that deaths by execution
were not included in the computation of the mortality tables on
which the insurer bases his rates, denial of recovery here would be
giving the insurer a windfall, for if such deaths were so included,
the insurer was paid to take such risk.
In sum, the forthright disposition of the problem in the principle case should put the matter at rest.
-HERSCHEL H. RoSE, JR.

NAvIGABLE WA mS -

NAviGABILITY -

RIPARAN

OwVNER'S

RIGHT OF AccEss. - The United States government authorized the
straightening of the James River to improve navigation between
Hopewell and Richmond, Va., a distance of twenty-five miles. It
was for the benefit of the city of Richmond, and the city brought
condemnation proceedings. Defendants, riparian owners, claimed
damages to their rights of access through prospective diversion of
the river from their lands. The city claimed that riparian owners
have no private property rights in the flowing of streams inconsistent with the public right of navigation, and that no damages
should be awarded such owners by reason of diversion or diminu10 Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N . Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889).
11 Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927).
i2 W. VA. RBv. CODE (1931) c. 42, art. 1, § 1.
13 The courts make an exception to life insurance contracts by holding that

the beneficiary in a policy of insurance who murders the insured will be denied
the right to recover thereon upon grounds of public policy. Johnston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S. E. 865 (1919) ; Wickline, Adm'r
v. Life Ins. Co., 106 W. Va. 424, 145 S. E. 743 (1928). The legislature has
constituted conviction of felonious killing a bar to the claim of the convicted
party to the insurance or property of the decedent. W. VA. REv. CoDE (1931)
c. 42, art. 4, § 2. See Note (1934) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 188; (1935) 41 W. VA. L.

Q. 287.
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tion of the flow of water past their lands as a result of the improvement. Held, for the city. Oliver v. City of Richmond.1
Streams in West Virginia and Virginia are in one of three
classes: non-navigable, floatable, or navigable.2 A floatable stream
is one capable of floating logs, rafts, and the like, during high
water for such a length of time as would make it beneficial for the
public so to use it.3 Such streams are not capable of practical
general use for navigation.4 Few courts draw the distinction between floatability and navigability; it is plainly a matter of degree.
At common law a navigable stream was one in which the tide
ebbed and flowed; that is the present English rule.5
In the
United States, a navigable stream is one navigable in fact.6 The
chief test is capacity for beneficial use in commerce.' The burden
of proof is on the party claiming it to be navigable.8 Courts take
judicial notice that some streams are navigable.9 Others are declared so by statute.'0 The rest have been or must be proven navigable as a matter of fact. The federal government has control of
all navigable streams." The Federal Water Power Act contains
a broad definition of what constitutes "navigable waters"' 2 and
'178 S. E. 48 (Va. 1935).
2 Gaston v. Mace, 33 W. Va. 14, 10 S. E. 60, 5 L. R. A. 392 (1889); Hot
Springs Lumber and Mfg. Co. v. Revercomb, 106 Va. 176, 55 S. E. 580, 9
L. R.A. (N. S.) 894 (1906); affirmed on rehearing, 110 Va. 240, 65 S. E. 557
(1909); Burner v. Nutter, 77 W. Va. 256, 87 S.E. 359 (1915).
3 Gaston v. Mace, supra n.2; Hot Springs Lumber and Mfg. Co. v. Revercomb, supra n. 2.
4Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9 (1849).

5 The theory actually originated in the United States and was adopted by
the English Courts. Chancellor Kent first set it forth in Palmer v. Mulligan,
3 Caine 307, 2 Am. Dec. 270 (N. Y. 1805). See 1 FARmLAx, WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS (1904) § 23a.
0 Gaston v. Mace, supra n.2; Barre v. Fleming, 29 W. Va. 314, 1 S.E. 731

(1887); The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 13 L. Ed. 1058 (1851).
71 FARNHAm, op. cit. supra n.5. (1904), § 26; The Montello, 20 Wall. 430,
22 L. Ed. 391 (1874); Harrison v. Fite, 148 Fed. 781 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906).
s Gaston v. Mace, supra n. 2.
OJames River, in Old Dominion Iron & Nail Works v. C. & 0. R. Co., 116
Va. 166, 81 S.E. 108 (1914); Ohio River, in Ravenswood v. Fleming, 22 W.
Va. 52, 46 Am. Rep. 485 (1882).
10 Economy Light and Power Co. v. U. S., 256 U. S. 113, 41 S. Ct. 409
(1920).
11 The commerce clause, U. S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, and the clause empowering Congress to make all laws necessary to carry into execution the federal
jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime matters, U. S. CONST. art. 3, § 2.
Leovy v. U. S., 177 U. S.621, 20 S.Ct. 797 (1899).
12 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), 16 U. S. C. A. § 796 (1926): " 'Navigable waters'
means those parts of streams or other bodies of water over which Congress
has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several States, and which -either in their natural or improved
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late decisions have done likewise.18 Today, almost any stream that
connects with and affects a navigable stream may be held navigable.
A riparian owner's rights respecting the water of a navigable
stream are subservient to the public use. This is true also of a
floatable stream; a riparian owner has no right to obstruct it by
dams or otherwise.1 4 He may erect a temporary obstruction like
a timber boom. 15 He may also make a reasonable use of the water
as it flows past.'8
At common law a riparian owner had a right of access to the
stream which could not be destroyed even for the improvement
of navigation without making compensation to the owner." That
is still the English rule.'8 The great weight of authority in the
United States sustains the ruling in the principal case, that the
riparian owner is entitled to no compensation.' 9 There are no
West Virginia decisions directly on the point. In Ravenswood 'v.
Fleming,20 however, it is stated that it is competent for the legislature to grant to municipal corporations the exclusive right to
build wharves on public navigable rivers without compensation to
the riparian owners. As against the state, the riparian owner has
no rights in the land below high water mark. But in Barre v.
Fleming2" the court states that a riparian owner has a right of access and can construct a wharf, and the like, and adds that the
condition, notwithstanding interruptions between navigable parts of such
streams or waters by falls, shallows, or rapids compelling land carriage, are
used or suitable for use for the transportation of persons or property in interstate or foreign commerce, including therein all such interrupting falls, shallows, or rapids; together with such other parts of streams as shall have been
authorized by Congress for improvement by the United States or shall havo
been recommended to Congress for such improvement after investigation under
its authority."
"3Economy Light and Power Co. v. U. S., supra n. 10, holding the Des
Plaines River in Illinois navigable. (The only actual navigation of it for
commercial purposes had been by canoes and rafts and this use had been discontinued over a hundred years before the suit was brought.) Arizona v.
California, 283 U. S. 423, 51 S. Ct. 522 (1931), holding the Colorado River
navigable at Boulder Dam. See Niles, Arizona v. California (1932) 10 N. Y.
U. L. Q. Rrv. 188.
14 Gaston v. Mace, supra n. 2.
15 Wilson v. Guyandotte Timber Co., 70 W. Va. 602, 74 S. E. 870 (1912).
16 Union Sand & Gravel Co. v. Northeott, 102 W. Va. 519, 135 S. E. 589
(1926).
17 1 FARNnAm, op. cit. supra n. 5, § 65.
IsSee notes (1922) 21 A. L. R. 206; (1934) 89 A. L. R. 1156.
19 Tid. I FARN aA, op. cit. supra n. 5, § 66, seemingly maintains the contrary position, that the riparian owner is entitled to compensation in most
states.
20 Supra n. 9.
21 Supra n. 6.
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only question involved in the Ravenswood ease was whether the
statute denying the riparian owner of the lot in an incorporated
town the right to build a wharf without consent of the town
council, was unconstitutional. 2
In a later case which did not
involve the public interest, the court re-affirmed the proposition
that a riparian owner has the "right of access to water including
' '2
a right of way to and from the navigable part. 3
-ROBERT

NEGLIGENCE -

CONFLICT OF LAws -

MERRICKS.

ACTION AGAINST SPousE

FOR TORT IN ANOTHER STATE. - Husband sued wife in tort for
personal injuries received while a passenger in an automobile
owned and operated by the latter. The accident occurred in Alabama, and suit was instituted in West Virginia. Held, such
actions are against the public policy of this state and cannot be
maintained, although permissible in the state where the injuries
were received. Poling v. Poling.'
The early common law concept of the legal unity of husband
and wife precluded tort actions between the spouses. 2 Therefore,
it was not until the general adoption of the Married Women's
Property Acts3 that the problem became of real significance. Although the principal case represents the decided *eight of authority, the courts are by no means in accord as to the effect of these
statutes upon the common law disability.4 The divergence may be
partly but certainly not entirely explainable by language variations in the respective statutes.
The tendency has been to treat the problem as primarily one
of statutory construction.'
Invoking the maxim that statutes
in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, it is
221 FARN-HAm,
23

op. cit. supra n.5, § 67d.

Union Sand & Gravel Co. v. Northcott, supra n. 16, at 527.

I Poling v. Poling, 179 S. E. 604 (W. Va. 1935).
2 MeCurdy, Torts Between Persons In Domestio Relations (1930) 43 flAv.
L. REV. 1030, 1033.
3 For the West Virginia Statutes, see W. VA. REV. CoDE (1931) c. 48, art.
3, particularly § 19, providing that "A married woman may sue and be sued
.the same in all cases as if she were a single woman .... "
4 The cases on this point are collected in NOTEs in (1924) 29 A. L. R. 1482;
(1924) A. L. R. 1406; (1926) 44 A. L. R. 794; (1927) 48 A. L. R. 293;
(1934) 89 A. L. R. 293.
GSee, for example, Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 96 S. E. 315 (1918),
in addition to the principal case.
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